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MYSTICISM, VERIDICALITY, AND MODALITY 
Robert Oakes 
A 37 year old housewife told a Gallup interviewer, "It's indescribable, 
except that all of a sudden you have no more doubts that there is a 
God-no more questions-you just know!" 
The Milwaukee Journal, December 11, 1976 
It may well be that nothing constitutes hallowed ground for statisticians-not 
even hallowed ground. In any case, it seems incontestable that 'data' developed 
from Gallup polls-albeit of considerable sociological (and psychological) 
interest-has negligible relevance for attempts to adjudicate the time-honored 
philosophical issue of the epistemic force of 'religious experience'. This not-
withstanding, our opening excerpt has inspired me to imagine that I have a very 
special friend-so special a friend that I can think of nothing more fitting to call 
her than 'SF'. Now among the many distinctive and endearing attributes of SF 
is that of being a theistic mystic. While she is very pleased about this, SF finds 
(so she has told me in confidence) that being a theistic mystic can occasionally 
be socially wearisome. That is, her many skeptical friends-not lacking in epis-
temological adroitness---Dften try to disturb her metaphysical serenity by invoking 
a long-standing and ostensibly plausible challenge to theistic mysticism: specifi-
cally, they are wont to insist that, lacking some reliable criterion for dis-
criminating veridical religious experience from the illusive variety, SF has no 
legitimate way of being certain that her 'apprehensions of God's presence' are 
veridical rather than illusive. 
With characteristic pertinacity, however, SF responds by appealing to an 
epistemological doctrine which occupies a venerable place within the tradition 
of theistic mysticism. I Specifically, and with a philosophical sophistication that 
has eluded many a theistic mystic, she responds as follows: 
The experiences in question are of such a nature that I do not require 
any criterion to be certain that they are veridical. 2 Rather, I have non-
critical certainty that such is the case. Alternatively, that my relevant 
experiences constitute veridical apprehensions of God's presence is 
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immediately apparent to me since the experiences in question have the very 
special epistemic status of being self-authenticating, i.e., of guaranteeing 
their own veridicality to their epistemic subjects. Accordingly, every such 
experience provides me with infallible justification for believing that it con-
stitutes a veridical awareness of God's presence. 
Needless to say that SF's skeptical friends (I am not one of them) regard this 
response as patently unacceptable. The only impact it has upon them is to arouse 
their epistemological ire to a level which may not be compatible with good 
mental health. Predictably, their counter-rejoinder proceeds along the following 
lines: 
Clearly, no experience3-whether 'religious' or not~ould conceivably 
authenticate itself to its epistemic subject, i.e., provide the latter with 
a guarantee of its veridicality. Rather, since no experience (even those 
which are in fact veridical) could enjoy logical immunity from being 
illusive, no veridical experience could be such that its veridicality was 
immediately apparent to its epistemic subject. Alternatively, for any 
experience e with the property of being veridical, that e is veridical 
could never be a truth which (in Chisholm's terms) 'presents itself' to 
its epistemic subject. Accordingly, without some (workable) criterion 
for discriminating veridical religious experiences from illusive ones, no 
one is entitled to be positive that his/her putative experiences of God's 
presence are in fact veridical. Hence, you are not entitled to be sure 
that your putative experiences of God's presence are in fact veridical. 
'Oh yes I am', retorts SF-and thus the dialectic escalates, with not the slightest 
(chance for any) meeting of minds. 
It seems clear that the foregoing encapsulates a long-standing and central 
disagreement between 'mystics'>and their critics. Now while much has been 
said and gainsaid about 'self-authenticating religious experience', I suggest that 
it remains an issue about which there is considerably more confusion than clarity, 
and, accordingly, about which lots more needs to be said. First of all, it seems 
to me that there is yet to be provided anything like a satisfactory explication of 
the issue. Alternatively, just how are we to understand the doctrine that there 
can occur experiences of God's presence with the very special epistemic property 
of being self-authenticating? Since nothing is more central to the epistemology 
of religious experience than the question of veridicality and just how it is to be 
adjudicated, arriving at a proper understanding of the self-authentication doctrine 
is of the first importance. 
I have argued elsewhere5-and remain convinced-that the concept of modal 
veridicality (discussed at length in the sequel) is absolutely indispensable to an 
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adequate grasp, let alone a satisfactory resolution, of the issue in question. In 
sum, I intend to show that the concept of modal (or essential) veridicality con-
stitutes nothing less than the key to the entire matter. In so doing, I shall flesh 
out and add lots of needed muscle to the 'prolegomenon' developed in my 
previous paper on this topic. Moreover, I shall formulate and defend a line of 
argument which played no role whatever in my former paper, and which-
assuming its success--can readily be seen to strengthen the mystic's position in 
no small way. While this line of argument falls short of establishing that SF and 
company should be regarded as decisively victorious on the self-authentication 
issue, it does establish a considerably less modest thesis than that defended in 
my previous paper. 
Briefly, the purpose of my 'prolegomenon' was to establish that, while self-
authenticating religious experience may be inconceivable, it is far from obvious 
(in contradistinction to what remains the strident contention of the critics) that 
such is the case. However, if my argumentation to follow is successful, what 
will have been established is the stronger or more significant thesis that the 
occurrence of self-authenticating religious experience gives substantial indication 
of being a perfectly conceivable state of affairs, 6 i.e., entails nothing that is 
repugnant to the intellect. Moreover, and of greater significance yet, the intriguing 
and perhaps surprising conclusion to emerge from our subsequent deliberations 
is that, insofar as the most spiritually profound sort of theistic religious experience 
is concemed-i.e., 'spiritual-union-with-God' (hereafter just 'spiritual-union')-
there is powerful warrant for denying the conceivability of there occurring an 
experience of that sort that is both veridical and non-self-authenticating. 
II 
I take it to be evident that a (logically) necessary condition of an experience's 
being self-authenticating is not simply that" it be veridical, but-much more 
strongly-that there be no possible world at which precisely that experience 
(occurs and) is nonveridical. Consider a veridical experience e with person N as 
its epistemic subject: now if e-albeit in fact veridical--<:ould conceivably have 
been illusive, it is thereby conceivable that N-though in fact she is not-should 
have been mistaken in believing e to be veridical. Given that, however, it hardly 
seems proper to regard e as providing N with a guarantee of its veridicality, 
i.e., with infallible justification for belief in its veridicality. Accordingly, to 
express the relevant point in the vocabulary of modality de re, since any experi-
ence that could not conceivably have been illusive would be veridical essentially 
(necessarily) rather than accidentally (contingently), a veridical experience would 
have to be veridical essentially in order to be self-authenticating. Thus, not only 
is illusive experience (obviously) disqualified from being self-authenticating," 
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but no veridical experience that could have been illusive would enjoy that distinc-
tion. Hence, only if there could occur veridical experience of God's presence 
to which veridicality was essential could there occur veridical experience of 
God's presence that was self-authenticating. 
Now I take it to be clear that any case of veridical sensory experience is such 
that veridicality is accidental to it. That is, for any sense-experience with the 
property of being veridical, it is conceivable that precisely that experience should 
have been illusive. Consider: at the present moment, I have no doubt whatever 
that I am seeing a telephone on my desk. Granted, however, that the 'telephone-
experience' I presently am having is veridical, I should think it undeniable that 
the phenomenological configuration of my veridical telephone-experience is in 
every respect replicable by an illusive telephone-experience (perhaps under hyp-
nosis, during extreme fatigue, drug ingestion, etc.). Accordingly, since my 
veridical telephone-experience is-in this regard-paradigmatic of veridical sen-
sory experience in general, it seems clear that the modal property being conceiv-
ably illusive is one which it shares with all veridical sensory experience. However, 
since veridical experience that could conceivably have been illusive is, ipso 
facto, veridical experience to which veridicality is accidental, it seems clear that 
no veridical sense-experience could have the property of being veridical essen-
tially. Rather, the property of veridicality must be8 accidental to any sense-experi-
ence exemplifying it. Accordingly, what is essential to all sense-experience is 
the conditional property if veridical then veridical accidentally. Hence, it seems 
clear that there could not occur veridical sensory experience to which veridicality 
was essential. 
Could there, however, occur veridical religious9 experience (veridical experi-
ence of God's presence) to which veridicality was essential? I propose that there 
is very solid justification for taking the answer to this question-and perhaps 
only this question-as constituting the answer to the question of whether there 
could occur veridical experience of God's presence that was self-authenticating, 
i.e., veridical experience of God's presence that would, by itself, guarantee its 
veridicality to its epistemic subject. How so? After all, while it seems transpa-
rent--as discussed above-that an experience's being veridical essentially con-
stitutes a necessary condition for (is entailed by) its being self-authenticating, it 
seems far from transparent that essential veridicality constitutes the only necessary 
condition for self-authentication, i.e., that an experience's being veridical essen-
tially is also sufficient for (or entails) its being self-authenticating. Rather, this 
needs to be argued. Accordingly, let us tum to what I take to be a convincing-if 
not entirely unimpeachable-argument on behalf of the contention that veridi-
cality constitutes a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for self-authenti-
cation (and thus for concluding that being veridical essentially and being self-
authenticating are logically equivalent properties). The success of this argument 
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would, of course, legitimize our paraphrasing the question of whether there could 
occur self-authenticating experience of God's presence into the question of 
whether there could occur veridical experience of God's presence to which 
veridicality was essential. Upon achieving that step, however, I suggest that we 
will have the very solid prologue to a winning argument in defense of the 
conceivability of self-authenticating religious experience. Accordingly, I shall 
go on to conclude that there is impressively little basis for the time-honored and 
cavalier dismissal of the mystics' claim to such experience. 
III 
Necessarily, veridical experience that is veridical accidentally (such as veridical 
sensory experience) fails to be self-authenticating, and the reason for this is not 
in the least obscure. That is, since every such veridical experience could conceiv-
ably have lacked the property of veridicality, it could never be the case that the 
veridicality which is in fact exemplified by any accidentally-veridical experience 
was simply a function of its qualitative character. Rather, it is necessarily the 
case that factors (e.g., corroborative testimony) other than-and completely 
independent of-the qualitative or phenomenological character of any such 
experience would be evidentially relevant to an adjudication of its veridicality 
by its epistemic subject. Accordingly, regardless of how much we may be 
prone-as we so often are-to rely solely on the qualitative nature of our 'ordi-
nary' experience as justification for belief in its veridicality, the point to be 
driven home is this: since the qualitative nature of any accidentally-veridical 
experience is compatible with its being nonveridical-since precisely that experi-
ence could have been illusive-there never could occur an accidentally-veridical 
experience such that its qualitative nature alone provided its epistemic subject 
with absolutely definitive or infallible justification for belief in its veridicality. 
Hence, it can properly be concluded that the non-self-authenticating status of 
'ordinary' veridical experience is attributable to its being conceivably nonverid-
ical. Alternatively, a veridical experience's being veridical accidentally is all 
that it takes for it to lack the property of being self-authenticating. 
Suppose, however, that there could occur veridical experience to which verid-
icality was essential? What I believe is demonstrable is that there is considerably 
more than ample justification for viewing any such experience as self-authenticat-
ing. How so? Well, for any experience to which veridicality was essential, the 
precise qualitative nature of that experience would be incompatible with-would 
preclude-its being illusive, i.e., there is no possible world at which there occurs 
an experience that is (or could have been) nonveridical but shares the precise 
qualitative nature of some veridical experience that was veridical essentially. 
Since that is so, however, what additional to the qualitative nature or 
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phenomenological content of any essentially-veridical experience could ever be 
required by its epistemic subject in order to secure her entitlement to be sure of 
its veridicality? Alternatively, the phenomenological content of any essentially-
veridical experience would seem to be all that it takes to provide its epistemic 
subject with definitive or infallible justification for belief in its veridicality. If 
that is so, of course, then any essentially-veridical experience would have the 
very special epistemic property of authenticating itself to its epistemic subject. 
I suggest that this point can both be sharpened and strengthened as follows: 
any veridical experience to which veridicality was essential would be an experi-
ence the veridicality of which was among those properties (or their exemplifica-
tions) that made up--composed-its qualitative nature. Alternatively, since it is 
impossible for any experience that was actually or conceivably nonveridical to 
be such that its phenomenological content was precisely identical to that of any 
veridical experience that was veridical essentially, it is evident that veridicality 
would be among those properties that compose the phenomenological content of 
any essentially-veridical experience. However, for any given experience, its 
phenomenological content gives every indication of being such that the awareness 
which its epistemic subject has of it is all-inclusive. Specifically, for any person 
P and experience e that is had by P, there is considerably more than ample basis 
for holding that P cannot but apprehend every property that is a component of 
e's phenomenological content, i.e., for holding that every such property 
announces itself to P. We need only consider, for example, the transparent 
perversity of claims such as 'Redness and luminosity are among those properties 
that compose the phenomenological content of the experience had by John at t, 
but John fails to apprehend redness at t.' 
Accordingly, the phenomenological content of any experience would seem to 
be such that its epistemic subject's awareness of it differs dramatically in (what 
might be termed) 'epistemic breadth' from the sort of awareness that one normally 
has of external objects/events (recognizing, of course, that the major segment 
of our experiences surely seem to be of external objects/events, thereby 
exemplifying a 'referential' or 'extrapsychological' aspect). For our awareness 
of external objects is rarely all-inclusive. Our usual perceptions of cars and 
kitchen tables, for example, rarely involves our being aware of all of their 
empirically ascertainable features, e.g., every mark and stain on their surfaces. 
This does not, of course, rule out cases wherein one's awareness of some external 
object is all-inclusive. Rather, it is simply to drive home the point that, in 
contradistinction to what is characteristic of our apprehension of perceptual data 
as such, all-inclusive or 'comprehensive' awareness of some external object is 
in no way a function of its epistemic subject's being aware of that object at all. 
Accordingly, there is very solid foundation for concluding that the epistemic 
subject of any experience the phenomenological content of which had veridicality 
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as a component-i.e., any experience to which veridicality was essential-would 
be immediately aware of its veridicality. Alternatively, for any veridical experi-
ence e to which veridicality was essential, that e is veridical gives every indication 
of being a proposition the truth of which is guaranteed to e's epistemic subject 
solely by virtue of e's phenomenological content. Hence, there would seem to 
be considerably more than ample justification for viewing any veridical experience 
to which veridicality was essential as-ipso facto-a veridical experience that 
was self-authenticating. 
One can, however, raise a plausible objection to the foregoing argument-an 
objection that is largely a priori in character, and, accordingly, that can be held 
to vitiate any argument for the claim that an experience's being veridical essen-
tially entails its being self-authenticating. 10 Specifically, it can be contended that 
veridicality-as a property that applies only to experiences-is, strictly speaking, 
an ontological (rather than an epistemological) property. Moreover, it seems 
eminently plausible that ontological properties have no epistemic entailments. 
In any case, it seems incontestable that an experience's being veridical is perfectly 
compatible with its epistemic subject's failing to know that it is. (For example, 
the relevant person-perhaps as a consequence of the unusual character of the 
experience or some other respectable reason-may either believe that his or her 
experience is illusive or adopt a skeptical attitude about its veridicality). Accord-
ingly, an experience's being veridical essentially is perfectly compatible with its 
epistemic subject's failing to know that it is-i.e., failing to know that it is 
veridical at all, and thus (a fortiori) failing to know that it is veridical in such 
a way as to preclude the conceivability of its being illusive. For veridicality does 
not magically become an epistemological property~r one with epistemic entail-
ments-in those cases (should there be any) wherein some experience exemplifies 
it essentially rather than accidentally. Hence, an experience's being veridical 
essentially is perfectly compatible with its epistemic subject's failing to have 
immediate awareness of its veridicality. Accordingly, it would seem that an 
experience's being veridical essentially does not entail its being self-authenticat-
ing. 
It seems to me that the preceding line of reasoning has considerable merit. 
However, I think it can readily be seen not to impair the thesis that an experience's 
being veridical essentially entails its being self-authenticating. For the occurrence 
of an essentially-veridical experience that was not known to be veridical by its 
epistemic subject (a fortiori not known by its epistemic subject to be veridical 
essentially) is perfectly compatible with its being true that essential-veridicality 
entails self-authentication. That is, while it could not fail to be the case that any 
self-authenticating experience would guarantee its veridicality to its epistemic 
subject, it must be emphasized that the relevant 'guarantee' has to be construed-
strictly speaking-not as categorical but as conditional in character. For since 
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being-certain-that-p entails (as the strongest version of) knowing-that-p, which, 
in tum, entails believing-that-p, the 'guarantee' in question presupposes the 
epistemic subject's belief in the veridicality of the relevant essentially-veridical 
experience. However, since human beings are not ideally rational beings, there 
can be (and assuredly have been and will be) cases wherein some of us fail to 
assent to the epistemically indubitable. Accordingly, it must be allowed that the 
(conjunctive) state of affairs consisting in an experience's being veridical essen-
tially and its epistemic subject's failing to know that it is veridical (let alone 
veridical essentially) is not self-contradictory. Hence, I propose the following 
contextual definition of 'self-authenticating' in terms of the intentional and epis-
temic notions of belief and certainty: 
A veridical experience e that occurs to some person N is self-authen-
ticating iff it is inconceivable both that N should (i) believe-strictly 
on the basis of e's phenomenological content-that e is veridical and 
(ii) fail to be certain of its veridicality, i.e., if N believes-(once again) 
strictly on the basis of e' s phenomenological content-that e is veridical, 
such belief would be logically sufficient for (would entail) N's being 
absolutely certain of e's veridicality. 
Consequently, if our preceding argument (for viewing any essentially-veridical 
experience as-ipso facto-self-authenticating) is sound, there is substantial 
warrant for holding that any veridical experience to which veridicality was essen-
tial would satisfy the definiens of the foregoing definition. 
Now it seems clear that-granted the success of our analysis heretofore-there 
remains a rugged road to hoe before we can properly claim to have made any 
significant inroads on behalf of the doctrine represented and defended by SF. 
For her many skeptical friends can agree with all that has been argued thus 
far--i.e., can agree that there is very strong justification for regarding an experi-
ence's being veridical essentially as all that it takes for it to be self-authen-
ticating-and still remain as recalcitrant as ever concerning their negative verdict 
on the conceivability of self-authenticating religious experience. Specifically, 
the skeptics can hold-and can plausibly be expected to hold-that (necessarily) 
all veridical experience (whether sensory or not) has at least this much in common 
with my veridical 'telephone-experience' discussed above: veridicality is acci-
dental to it. Thus, the skeptics can hold to the conceptual impossibility of there 
occurring veridical experience of any kind (accordingly, veridical experience of 
God's presence) that could not conceivably have lacked the property of veridi-
cality. Hence, they can be expected to contend that what is essential to each and 
every experience is the conditional property if veridical then veridical acciden-
tally. 
However, I suggest that we are now prepared to establish that the occurrence 
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of essentially-veridical experience of God's presence is perfectly conceivable, 
and, accordingly, for rejecting the skeptical view that, necessarily, all veridical 
experience is veridical accidentally. 
IV 
Initially, there might be the temptation to endorse an argument along the 
following lines: since the theistic conception of divinity entails that experience 
of God's presence is inherently revelatoryJ '-i.e. , since there could be no veridical 
experience of that sort which failed to constitute a divine 'disclosure'-the 
omnipotence of God (if God exists) suffices to ensure His ability to bring about 
veridical experience of His presence to which veridicality was essential. Alterna-
tively, God's omnipotence includes the power to bring about veridical experiences 
of His presence the precise qualitative nature of which could not be replicated 
in all respects by any nonveridical experience 'of His presence'. While it seems 
to me that this argument is very far from wrong-headed, and, moreover, consti-
tutes an embryonic and very rough version of a successful argument on behalf 
of the conceivability of essentially-veridical religious experience, there would 
seem to be eminently good reason for rejecting it as it stands. 
Specifically, the skeptic can readily and plausibly respond by asserting that, 
in the absence of compelling justification for believing otherwise, it is proper 
to maintain that there could not occur a veridical religious experience with 
phenomenological content that was not in every respect replicable by an illusive 
'religious experience'. Alternatively, for any object 0 of possible experience, 
why believe that there can occur veridical experiences of 0 the phenomenological 
configurations of which are unique to veridical experience of O? Accordingly, 
why believe that there could occur veridical experience of God's presence with 
phenomenological configurations that were not replicable-in-all-respects by some 
illusive' experience of God's presence'? Rather, and notwithstanding the omnipo-
tence of God, it is proper to maintain that it would not be within His power to 
bring about veridical experience of His presence to which veridicality was essen-
tial. Call this the Phenomenological Replication Argument (PRA). 
It seems to me that the PRA deserves to be taken very seriously. That is, I 
think that in the absence of compelling justification for believing otherwise, it 
is proper to deny that there could occur veridical experience of God's presence 
to which veridicality was essential. However, what I hope to establish in the 
sequel is that-to the fatal misfortune of the PRA-there is compelling justifica-
tion for believing othenvise. Before proceeding to adduce such justification, 
however, let it be clear that I shall make no attempt to produce what I take to 
be inherently unproducible-namely, a rigorous or definitive analysis of what 
would be central to the phenomenological content of veridical religious experi-
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ence. Indeed, it would seem to be incontestable that phenomenological properties 
as such-not simply those indigenous to veridical experience of God's presence-
could not but contain some unanalyzable or conceptually inexpressible compo-
nents. 12 Moreover, this seems especially evident insofar as the phenomenological 
properties that compose feeling-states are concerned, and it seems abundantly 
clear that mystical states of consciousness-notwithstanding their 'noetic' com-
ponent-are closer in character and texture to states of feeling than to states of 
cognition. 13 Accordingly, I suggest that the mystics' traditional insistence upon 
the ineffability of religious experience-particularly of the incomparably profound 
experience of 'spiritual-union'--deserves to be treated with considerably more 
respect than has traditionally come its way from analytic philosophers. 
This being said, however, I hope to establish that what is analyzable about 
the concept of veridical religious experience-specifically of veridical spiritual-
union experience-yields us compelling justification for concluding not simply 
that the occurrence of essentially-veridical experience of that sort is perfectly 
conceivable (and thus that the PRA is unsound), but, more strongly, that the 
occurrence of veridical spiritual-union experience to which veridicality is nones-
sential is inconceivable. Accordingly, what emerges from our deliberations is 
that there is powerful warrant for concluding not only that it is conceivable for 
there to occur self-authenticating spiritual-union experience, but, more strongly 
and more intriguingly, that it is inconceivable for there to occur veridical spiritual-
union experience that failed to be self-authenticating. 
v 
At the very heart of the effort to secure our thesis is the need to devote some 
close attention to a relational property that, if theists are correct, is exemplified 
by contingent-i.e., generable and perishabl~bjects in both the distributive 
and collective senses: namely, is exemplified by any single contingent object 
and by the aggregate of contingent objects that constitute what we call 'the 
cosmos'. The property of which I speak is being-God-produced-and-God-con-
served. 14 Our specific purpose in this section is to adduce compelling justification 
for maintaining that this property could not fail to be essential to any contingent 
object that exemplified it. The major significance of this for the success of our 
thesis will become clear in the subsequent and closing section. 
Exactly what, however, mandates the conclusion that being-God-produced-
and-God-conserved could not fail to be essential to any contingent object that 
exemplified it? Consider: if-as is held by theism-the final or foundational 
principle of explanation for the coming-into-being and continuance-in-being of 
contingent objects can only be found in the exercise of (respectively) God's 
productive and conserving powers, it seems unimpeachable that the property in 
MYSTICISM, VERIDICALITY, AND MODALITY 227 
question is possessed by contingent objects simply because of their ontological 
contingency. Perhaps more perspicuously, contingent objects could properly be 
said to exemplify this property because-in contradistinction to self-existent 
objects such as, e.g., numbers and properties (though I recognize the controversy 
here)- no contingent object is such that its inherent or essential nature dictates 
its existence. Accordingly, if contingent objects have the property of being-God-
produced-and-God-conserved, that they do so seems undeniably attributable to 
their requiring-ultimately if not proximately-the productive and conserving 
activities of God for (respectively) their coming-into-being and perdurance. Alter-
natively, the exercise of God's productive and conserving powers would be what 
it takes to ensure the initial and ongoing existence of contingent objects. 
However, if the exercise of such divine powers is really (as theists, of course, 
urge) what it takes for the actualization of 'contingent being', then whatever is 
a contingent object is ipso facto God-produced-and-God-conserved-i.e., any 
contingent object's being God-produced-and-God-conserved would constitute a 
function of its being-a-contingent-object. Alternatively, any contingent object 
would exemplify the former property solely by virtue of exemplifying the latter. 
This being so, however, it is clear that there could exist a contingent object that 
was God-produced-and-God-conserved nonessentially only if there could exist 
a contingent object that was a contingent object nonessentially. Accordingly, all 
that is needed to warrant a rejection of the view that there could be contingent 
objects that exemplified being-God-produced-and-God-conserved accidentally 
is decisive justification for rejecting the view that there could be contingent 
objects that exemplified being-a-contingent-object accidentally. 
Could there not, however, be contingent objects to which the property of 
being-a-contingent-object was accidental? Surely not. For the claim that there 
could exist contingent objects that were contingent objects accidentally-i.e., 
contingent objects that could have (existed and)failed to be contingent objects-
has modal entailments that are patently unpalatable to reason. Specifically, that 
there could exist contingent objects that in some possible world or other exist 
as non-contingent objects entails that there is at least one possible world at which 
there exists, e.g., a polar bear, or a star, or a mountain-indeed, any contingent 
object that you please-that is strictly identical to an object which exists at some 
other possible world as God or as (an abstract object such as) a number, property, 
state of affairs, or proposition. However, if this is not paradigmatic of an intui-
tively or self-evidently unacceptable modal scenario, I am unable to understand 
what would constitute such a paradigm. Accordingly, its repugnance to the 
intellect dictates our rejection of the view that there could exist contingent objects 
to which being-a-contingent-object was accidental. 
So: since this is precisely what is required to warrant a rejection of the view 
that there could exist contingent objects to which being-God-produced-and-God-
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conserved was accidental, the proper conclusion to be drawn is that there could 
not exist contingent objects to which that property was accidental. Let it be clear 
that this does not constitute an affirmative begging of the question of God's 
existence since it does not entail that there are any contingent objects with the 
property of being-God-produced-and-God-conserved. Rather, that there is com-
pelling justification for denying the possibility of contingent objects to which 
that property was accidental is-taken alone-perfectly compatible with the view 
that such a property is not exemplified by contingent objects at all. 
Hence, the question which remains to be addressed is this: exactly what is the 
significance of all this for the success of our thesis? 
VI 
I take the following passage from Thomas Merton to be of central importance 
for what is to be established in this concluding section: 
... true contemplation is the experience of an immediate spiritual union 
with God, a union which can only be effected by God and which is 
essentially a union of supernatural charity ... no spirit other than God 
Himself can unite himself immediately to the soul, and no one but God 
can infuse supernatural charity into the soul. .. no spirit less than the 
Spirit of God can possibly produce even plausible imitation of mystical 
union ... anyone who has experienced true mystical union can see at once 
the infinite distance that lies between it and the false article ... 15 
In the foregoing, Fr. Merton reminds us of the significant axiom that has been 
emphasized by every major theistic mystic: 16 namely, that (necessarily) veridical 
spiritual-union experience-i.e., what Merton terms 'true mystical union'--con-
stitutes a divine bestowal. While we can refine our 'receptive faculties' to allow 
more of the 'divine light' to 'illuminate' the soul,17 finite (hence human) persons 
lack the power to effect true mystical union. Rather, no limited self could con-
ceivably have the power to bring about spiritual union with the Supreme Self, 
... a union that is so purely and perfectly natural that no created nature 
could possibly bring it about. 18 
In further elaboration of this point, Merton goes on to note: 
Both Saint John of the Cross and Saint Thomas clearly distinguish 
between acquired wisdom, which is the fruit of man's own study and 
of his thought, and infused wisdom or contemplation, which is a gift 
from God ... Man's "knowledge and ability"-acquired wisdom--can do 
nothing to bring a man to" ... Union with God. "19 
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Consider Merton's contention (in the opening quote) that' . .. no spirit less than 
the spirit of God can possibly produce even a plausible imitation of mystical 
union' (italics mine). 1 suggest that we are now positioned to establish the 
following: quite independently of whether Merton-and the mystical tradition 
in general- is right is maintaining that nothing short of God, e.g., our own 
imaginations, or, for that matter, malicious demons, could possibly be the source 
of even a plausible imitation of veridical spiritual-union, such a doctrine is 
extraordinarily close to the sober truth. Specifically, what can now be established 
is that no nonveridical experience of 'spiritual-union' ,-i.e., no putative spiritual-
union experience that was not effected by God--could possibly constitute a 
perfect imitation of veridical spiritual-union, and, accordingly, that (necessarily) 
any veridical spiritual-union experience would be veridical essentially. 
To begin with, since it is necessarily true that any case of veridical spiritual-
union constitutes an occurrence that can only be effected by God, it is clear that: 
Necessarily, for any putative spiritual-union experience e, if e is verid-
ical, e is God-produced-and-God-conserved. 
Conversely, however, since it is no less evident that there could not occur a 
God-produced-and-God-conserved spiritual-union experience that was illusive, 
it is also clear that: 
Necessarily, for any putative spiritual-union experience e, if e is God-
produced-and-God-conserved, e is veridical. 20 
Alternatively, a spiritual-union experience's being veridical is necessary as well 
as sufficient for its being God-produced-and-God-conserved. Accordingly, and 
(I think) intriguingly, being-a-veridical-spiritual-union-experience and being-a-
God-produced-and-God-conserved-spiritual-union-experience are logically equi-
valent properties, i.e., entail each other. 
As we have seen, however, any contingent object with the property of being-
God-produced-and-God-conserved could not fail to exemplify that property essen-
tially. Hence, this would also be the case for any contingent phenomenological 
object with that property, e.g., any experience of spiritual-union. However, since 
a spiritual-union experience's being veridical (in addition to entailing) is entailed 
by its being-God-produced-and-God-conserved-is entailed by its possession of 
a property that can only be had essentially-no spiritual-union experience that 
was God-produced-and-God-conserved could fail to be veridical essentially. 
(Clearly, just as no contingent truths are entailments of necessary truths, the de 
re correlate of this unimpeachable de dicto modal axiom is that, for any object 
o and property p, 0 has p essentially if (1) there is some property q that 0 has 
essentially, and (2) that 0 has q entails that 0 has p.) Accordingly, the inexorable 
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conclusion to which we have been led is that there could not conceivably occur 
a veridical spiritual-union experience that failed to be an essentially-veridical 
spiritual-union experience. Thus, any veridical spiritual-union experience would 
have the distinction of being such that its phenomenological content could not 
conceivably be replicated-in-every-respect by any illusive spiritual-union experi-
ence. 
Before finalizing, however, an important excursus is required: we need to 
consider a plausible objection2! to the principle-absolutely central to our thesis-
that a spiritual-union experience's being veridical is necessary as well as sufficient 
for its being-God-produced-and-God-conserved. It proceeds as follows: If (God 
exists an d)-as theism maintains--everything contingent is God-produced-and-
God-conserved, then, since nonveridical spiritual-union experience is no less 
contingent than would be the veridical variety, it follows that experiences of the 
fonner sort would also be God-produced-and-God-conserved (and, of course, 
like everything else with that property, would exemplify it essentially). Hence, 
a spiritual-union experience's being-God-produced-and-God-conserved does not 
entail its being veridical. Afortiori, it does not entail its being veridical essentially. 
I suggest that we can accommodate this objection by invoking a venerable 
metaphysical distinction-namely, that between substances and modes. This 
distinction-while not without some rough edges-has what I think is consider-
able intuitive appeal and the support of numerous influential metaphysicians 
throughout history. In Book II, Chapter 12 of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, John Locke observes: 
... the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are 
taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by them-
selves ... (Para. 6). 
As for modes: 
... modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain 
not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consi-
dered as dependences on, or affections of, substances ... (Para. 4). 
Clearly, the core component of the substance-mode distinction, as formulated 
and defended by Locke and its many proponents is that the existence of such 
items as experiences, decisions, high-blood pressure and diabetes conditions 
presuppose (conceptually) the existence of a 'substance' or 'logical subject' to 
whom they apply or occur. In short, substances are 'metaphysically prior' to 
modes. Hence, since experiences lack the capacity for 'subsisting by themselves,' 
but rather are modes (or affections) of sentient beings-hence persons-beings 
of this latter sort constitute the 'logical subjects' of such modes. 
Granted that this is so, however, precisely how does it constitute a foundation 
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for coping with the objection in question? Well, while theism entails that God 
produces and conserves all (contingent) substances 'as a matter of course', it 
does not entail that God produces and conserves all modes of substances 'as a 
matter of course', particularly when the modes in question are the experiences 
had by those 'substances' that constitute human persons. More strongly, an 
entailment of theism can readily be seen to be that God does not produce and 
conserve all of the experiences that occur to human persons. Consider: the 
doctrine of human moral agency occupies a venerable place in the theistic view 
of the world. Accordingly, it is central to theism that at least some human 
behavior is produced and conserved by humans. For if God were the productive 
and conserving cause of all human (decision and) action, then we could hardly 
be said to constitute moral agents. Rather, it would then be the case that God 
would be the moral agent responsible for 'our' (decisions and) actions. Hence, 
a doctrine which is central to theism (human moral agency) entails that some of 
our 'modes' -paradigmatic ally , those which constitute our (decisions and) 
actions-are such that we alone are their producers and conservers. Thus, while 
God-as the producer and conserver of all substances-is the producer and 
conserver of all persons, He is not the producer and conserver of all modes of 
persons. 
Granted that the foregoing is sound, however, exactly how does it warrant 
the conclusion that God is not the producer and conserver of all experiences had 
by persons? As follows: what experiences we have is often a decisional matter, 
i. e., many of our experiences are a function of the decisions that we make. 22 For 
example, if N decides to rob a bank, he thereby provides himself with a number 
of experiences that he would not have had otherwise---e.g., holding a gun on 
people, seeing a terrified teller, laying his hands on an extraordinary amount of 
cash, and, presumably, the 'introspective' experience of anxiety brought about 
by his participation in a serious crime. Hence, one of the clear implications of 
theism-by virtue of its commitment to the doctrine of human moral agency-is 
that many of the experiences that occur to persons are brought about and conserved 
by those persons, i.e., God is not the producer and conserver of all human 
experiences any more than He is the producer and conserver of all human 
(decisions and) actions. 
Given, then, that one of the propositions denied by a theistic view of the world 
is that all of the experiences that occur (can occur) to persons are (would be) 
God-produced-and-God-conserved, I think it can properly be concluded that no 
non veridical spiritual-union experience could have God as its productive and 
conserving cause. Let it be clear, however, that this is not to suggest anything 
so odd as the occurrence of any such experience would invariably be explainable 
as the result of some decision on the part of its epistemic subject. 23 While the 
purpose of the foregoing was to establish that the doctrine of human moral agency 
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yields us compelling foundation for concluding that not all human experiences 
are to be included among those contingent items that are (if theism is true) 
God-produced-and-God-conserved, this does not preclude the occurrence of 
human experiences that would fail to be God-produced-and-God-conserved for 
reasons that are completely independent of human decision. And what I think 
can readily be established is that such must be the case for any nonveridical 
spiritual-union experience. Alternatively, what I believe can be shown is that 
there could not conceivably occur nonveridical spiritual-union experience that 
was God-produced-and-God-conserved, and, accordingly, that it is demonstra-
tively as well as intuitively correct to maintain that a spiritual-union experience's 
being-God-produced-and-God conserved entails its being veridical. 
The relatively simple argument I have in mind is rooted in something very 
much like the Cartesian principle that a perfectly good being never deceives. 
While I do not (as, of course, Descartes did not) endorse what I consider to be 
the indefensible claim that there could never occur cases of epistemic deception 
that a perfectly good being would fail to prevent-indeed, given that God exists, 
there are uncountably many such cases-that there can occur nonveridical 
spiritual-union experience that was God-produced-and-God-conserved entails 
something far more pernicious than a perfectly good being's acquiescence in a 
case of epistemic deception, i.e., it entails that there could occur cases of epistemic 
deception that were brought about by God. However, it seems to me that the 
coup de grace has to be this: that there could occur nonveridical spiritual-union 
experience that was God-produced-and-God-conserved entails that God could be 
the productive and conserving cause of epistemic deception concerning not simply 
'experience of His presence' as such, but experience of His presence that consti-
tutes religious experience of the most spiritually profound sort. Surely, if it is 
not transparent that such a state of affairs is precluded by the concept of a 
maximally good being, I cannot begin to understand how any intelligible content 
can be assigned to that concept. Accordingly, it is eminently proper to conclude 
that no nonveridical spiritual-union experience could fail to be among those 
experiences or phenomenological modes of persons that lacked the property of 
being God-produced-and-God-conserved. 
To finalize, then, I believe we have secured our thesis that any spiritual-union 
experience with the property of being veridical would, ipso facto, have the 
property of being veridical essentially, i.e., the property of being such that no 
illusive spiritual··union experience could be a perfect phenomenological imitation 
of that veridical spiritual-union experience. Hence, since we have seen there to 
be powerful warrant for holding that any experience to which veridicality was 
essential would be an experience that was self-authenticating, there is precisely 
such warrant for holding that the occurrence of self-authenticating religious 
experience constitutes a conceivable state of affairs solely on the condition that 
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the occurrence of veridical spiritual-union experience constitutes a conceivable 
state of affairs. Clearly, however-and notwithstanding the full range of disag-
reement concerning just how to unpack the attribute of omnipotence-the power 
to effect veridical spiritual-union experience could not be lacked by any being 
worthy of the title God. Accordingly, whatever might be said of the epistemolog-
ical claims of SF and the mystical tradition in general, there seems to be very 
strong justification for rejecting as ill-founded the time-honored contention that 
the notion of self-authenticating religious experience is conceptually unaccepta-
ble. 24 
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NOTES 
1. Cf., for example, The Life oj Teresa oj Jesus, translated and edited, with an introduction, by 
E. Allison Peers (New York: Image Books, 1958), p. 251; John Baillie, Our Knowledge oJ God 
(London: Charles Scribner Sons, 1949), p. 132; and Thomas Merton, New Seeds oJ Contemplation 
(New York: New Directions Books, 1961), p. 233. for variegated statements of the doctrine that 
the most spiritually significant apprehensions of God's presence are such that they guarantee their 
own veridicality to their epistemic subjects. 
2. It seems to me that any attempt to provide a convincing rigorous definition of 'veridical' may 
well be no less quixotic than attempts to provide convincing rigorous definitions of so many other 
key concepts introduced into philosophical discussion. This notwithstanding, however, I suggest 
that our grasp of what it takes for an experience to be veridical is no more obscure than our grasp 
of what it takes for a proposition to be true (i.e., not really obscure at all). For some elaboration of 
this point, see my 'Religious Experience, Self· Authentication, and Modality De Re: A Prolegomenon' , 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1979), pp. 217-24. 
3. It should be clear that 'experience' is used here-and in the sequel-in the 'referential' or 
extrapsychological sense, i.e., the sense in which 'N is having a veridical experience of 0' entails 
that the existence of 0 is in no way a function of N's experience of it. Accordingly, we are not 
using 'experience' in the sense in which one often is said to experience her pains, her regrets, her 
after·images, her disappointments, etc. 
4. I shall often use 'mystic(s)' as a shorthand for 'theistic mystic(s)', i.e., for any theist who 
eschews the technique of discursive proof in favor of the view that knowledge/certainty concerning 
the reality and will of God is to be had by 'direct experience' of God/God's presence, and, in 
addition, claims to have had precisely such experience. 
S. Op. cit. 
6. The one presupposition of this argument is that God's existence gives compelling indication of 
being a perfectly conceivable state of affairs. It seems to me that, given the notorious unsuccess of 
'ontological disproofs' of God's existence-indeed, so far as I know, there is no rationally persuasive 
argument for the conceptual falsity of God exists in the literature of philosophical theology-this 
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presupposition is entirely appropriate. 
7. Unfortunately, a great deal of confusion has grown up around this point, i.e., it has often been 
held that the occurrence of self-authenticating religious experience is impossible because the occurr-
ence of illusive religious experience is possible. For an attempt to establish the misguided character 
of any such argument, see my 'Religious Experience and Rational Certainty', Religious Studies Vol. 
12 (1976), pp. 311-18. 
8. Since the property of veridicality is accidental to any sense-experience that exemplifies it, then 
it must be accidental to any sense-experience that exemplifies it. Alternatively, given the incontestable 
modal principle that whatever is conceivable (or logically possible) is necessarily conceivable, since 
it is conceivable for all veridical sense-experience to be nonveridical, it is (ipso facto) necessarily 
conceivable for all veridical sense-experience to be nonveridical. Accordingly, no veridical sense-
experience could have been such that its veridicality was essential to it-i.e., the property of 
veridicality must be accidental to any sense-experience exemplifying it. 
9. This question, of course, assumes that experiences which qualify as religious in character are 
(ipso facto) nonsensory in character, or that experiences which are candidates for being veridical 
apprehensions of God's presence do not involve the external senses. Such a doctrine is absolutely 
central to theistic mysticism. One need only note Saint Teresa's disdain for 'visions which are seen 
with the eyes of the body' (op. cit., p. 260) and the low esteem in which Saint John of the Cross 
held all 'apprehensions ... which are communicated through sense ... ' (Ascent of Mount Carmel, 
translated and edited, with a general introduction, by E. Allison Peers. (New York: Image Books, 
1958), p. 260. (Italics mine)). For an argument that raises some questions about the traditional 
bifurcation between sensory experience and religious experience, see my 'Religious Experience, 
Sense-Perception, and God's Essential Unobservability', Religious Studies, Vol. 17 (1981), pp. 
357-67. 
10. See Michael Levine's valuable paper 'Can There be Self-Authenticating Experiences of God?', 
Religious Studies, Vol. 19 (1983), pp. 229-34 and my reply in the same (June) issue, pp. 235-39. 
11. Cf. George Mavrodes, Belief in God (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 53. This point, 
which is of major significance to our thesis, is developed and documented in significant detail in 
the final section of this paper. 
12. Surely, we have learned at least this much from distinguished epistemologists of the 'immediate' 
such as C. 1. Lewis. 
13. As pointed out, of course, by so many commentators of mysticism. Cf., for example, William 
James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modem Library, 1902 and 1929), 
p. 371. 
14. While the doctrine that contingent objects could not continue-in-existence without God's con-
serving activity any more than they could begin to exist without God's productive activity is absolutely 
integral to traditional theistic metaphysics, it seems to me that it may well have an entailment from 
which many traditional theists would recoil. See my 'Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?', 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1983), pp. 105-12. 
15. Thomas Merton, The Ascent to Truth (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1951 and 
1979), p. 70. 
16. One might consult, for example, Saint John of the Cross (op. cit.), pp. 177-84, esp. pp. 179-80, 
Saint Teresa (op_ cit.), pp. 173-219, and William James (op. cit.), p. 372. 
17. The 'illumination' metaphor is, of course, used very widely among theistic mystics. See Saint 
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John of the Cross (op. cit.), p. 181, and Abraham Isaac Kook, The Lights of Penitence. The Moral 
Principles. Lights of Holiness. Essays. Letters. and Poems, translation and introduction by Ben Zion 
Bokser (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 221. Kook contends there that all things endeavor 'to 
conform to the inflow of the light of the En Sof'. 
18. The Ascent to Truth, p. 70. Incidentally, Fr. Merton has some intriguing things to say about 
the phenomenological content of mystical union-i.e., about the phenomenology of 'loss of self': 
see p. 284 of New Seeds of Contemplation. What Merton has to say there is remarkably similar to 
what is maintained by Saint John of the Cross on p. 182 (op. cit.). 
19. The Ascent to Truth, p. 75 (Merton's italics). 
20. Perhaps, however, this principle is not obviously as unproblematic as I take it to be. I shall deal 
very soon with a plausible objection to it. 
21. I thank the editor of this journal for calling it to my attention. 
22. I use 'decisional' here primarily in the broad or 'extensional' sense. That is, in choosing to 
perform some action, we do not usually choose (or intend) to have all of the experiences implied 
by that action (indeed, we rarely know what they are). For example, in choosing to go on an African 
safari, I do not thereby choose to confront a leopard, but such an experience may well be one result 
of my choosing to go on an African safari. In just this sense, many of our experiences are functions 
of our decisions. 
23. There could, of course, occur nonveridical spiritual-union experiences which are to be explained 
in precisely this way, i.e., as a result of some drug ingested by its epistemic subject. 
24. I thank the editor of Faith and Philosophy and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions 
that led to (what I hope are) major improvements in this paper. 
